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SO LITTLE PREVENTION
It is by now widely accepted that the crime
prevention impetus in South Africa has waned
considerably since government adopted the
National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) in
1996. However, the NCPS, and the enthusiasm that
surrounded it at the time of its release, along with
the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) that
followed soon afterwards, remain historical
reminders of a hope for effective crime prevention
as a central feature of South African security
governance.1 What these policies, particularly the
NCPS, argued for was the creation of a holistic,
whole-of-society approach to the governance of
safety and security – a whole-of-society approach
that entailed aligning resources to solutions, rather
than solutions to resources. They aimed at
mobilising the resources, knowledge and capacities
of a host of role players for the resolution of safety
problems. For every safety issue a whole-of-society
approach encourages us to ask the question: ‘Who
could be involved in crafting a solution?’  
To realise this approach, the NCPS envisaged a
‘maximisation of civil society’s participation in
mobilising and sustaining crime prevention
initiatives.’2 Similarly, the White Paper on Safety
and Security set out a preventative approach that
would encompass all 
activities which reduce, deter or prevent the
occurrence of specific crimes firstly, by altering
the environment in which they occur, secondly
by changing the conditions which are thought to
cause them, and thirdly by providing a strong
deterrent in the form of an effective Justice
System.3
Despite these strong calls for a preventative focus,
a reactive law enforcement approach has taken
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centre stage in South African security governance
reform initiatives. To the extent that crime
prevention has been given attention this has been
in a piecemeal fashion and, importantly, in ways
that have narrowed the definition of crime
prevention to little more than a handmaiden of
law enforcement.4 Accordingly, although crime
prevention is intended to offset more traditional,
coercive strategies of crime control, it has been
implemented in South Africa in ways that have
seen it sidelined in favour of short-term and
tougher approaches.5 This is evidenced, for
instance, in longer minimum sentences; more
aggressive policing tactics, the most recent of
which have been statements about shooting to
kill; as well as in name changes in the South
African Police Service – for instance the
suggestion to replace the SAPS term ‘service’ with
the term ‘force’, and the reintroduction of military
ranks.6
These developments have flown directly in the
face of the proposals set out in the NCPS.7 The
predominance of law enforcement approaches has
also manifested itself in the way policing
partnerships have evolved between the South
African police and other policing institutions.
Private security and community patrols in
neighbourhoods have increasingly evolved as
adjuncts to the state police in ways that reinforce
a law enforcement approach, rather than as a
source of policing resources that support a more
preventative approach.8
Accordingly, while there is much knowledge,
much policy and much agreement, today, some 15
years after the introduction of the NCPS, there is
still very little to show for it. Prevention is not a
central feature of South African security
governance. It remains very much a second
cousin within the South African criminal justice
family – and a poor and neglected second cousin
at that. This is not to say that there have not been
successful crime prevention programmes in
operation – a recent very significant example was
the policing of the South African Soccer World
Cup, which was in many ways a model of
successful crime prevention. This success was in
large part due to the fact that the relevant
resources needed to resolve potential safety issues
– state and non-state – were aligned in novel
ways. A whole-of-society governance approach
was adopted, and this enabled preventative
solutions to be realised through ‘flexibly linking
different nodes together or drawing on a
particular node as the situation demanded’.9 The
challenge, of course, is how to sustain this
approach, developed during a ‘state of exception’,
beyond the World Cup.10
Despite these and other successes, prevention
remains very much an historical ideal rather than
a reality in South Africa today. Prevention,
particularly within criminal justice, continues to
be seen almost exclusively through the narrow
lens of deterrence. Yet, as the NCPS made so
abundantly clear, the domain of prevention is, and
should be, much more extensive:
Crime needs to be tackled in a comprehensive
way, which means going beyond an exclusive
focus on policing and the Justice system. It
means problem-solving to address the causal
factors which provide opportunities for crime
and limit the likelihood of detection. The
framework outlined in this strategy brings a far
wider range of solutions to bear on specific
crimes, as well as creating roles for a broader
range of participants.11
BLAMING AND PUNISHMENT
Why is this so? Answers to this question are not
hard to find. One obvious answer is that the
business of criminal justice is fundamentally the
business of blaming, and blaming and prevention
do not make easy bedfellows. Invariably one will
be emphasised at the expense of the other, who
will be forced to leave the bed. Given this, why
does blaming so often, and so typically, trump
prevention? Although this is a complex issue we
propose to draw out three significant threads in
answering this question by turning around a
pithy, albeit rather crude, turn of phrase that Bill
Clinton reportedly used when asked by his
campaign team what the focus of his election
campaign should be. He is reported to have
retorted, ‘It’s the economy, stupid’.  
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From blame to prevention: Crime 
The label ‘crime’ and the meaning it brings with it
constitute a problem for prevention. This meaning
stands in the way of prevention within criminal
justice. More specifically, it is the linking of the
terms ‘crime’ and ‘prevention’ within the
expression ‘crime prevention’ that is a source of
the problem. When ‘crime’ and ‘prevention’ are
tightly coupled, prevention tends to be sidelined. 
John Braithwaite makes this point when he argues
that when we label a harm a ‘crime’, we ‘call out’ or
‘hail out’ a blaming response.12 We realise this
blaming response by giving this harm/crime over
to the institutions of criminal justice. Braithwaite
argues that one of the interesting things about the
assemblages of institutions we refer to as the
‘criminal justice system’ is that they are one of the
few sets of governance institutions that consider a
problem to be solved when someone has been
blamed and punished for a harm.13 Braithwaite in
making this point contrasted this feature of
criminal justice with the response to ‘accidents’
within the airline industry, where blaming might
take place but it is most definitely not considered
to be the end of the matter. 
One might add to Braithwaite’s example the case
of the financial services industry.  For instance,
while blame has certainly been applied as the
world has responded to the recent set of financial
crises, and while some people have indeed been
punished, these blaming actions have not been
thought of as providing an adequate problem-
solving analysis of the regulatory inadequacies that
gave birth to this crisis.14 Braithwaite, in
advocating an alternative solution to the problem
of offending goes so far as to say ‘…for no type of
offending is imprisonment the normal response
that is needed…’.15
Jonathan Simon has taken this line of thinking
forward by coining the term ‘governing through
crime’.16 What he uses this term to refer to are the
meanings and associated actions we bring to the
security governance table when we ‘make up’
harms as crimes. For instance, in order for the
police to be able to do something about an
incident, they have to open a docket and classify it
according to a particular crime type. This
classification process results in the governing of
harms exclusively through institutions designed
and developed to blame and punish ‘crime’ – such
as the criminal justice system. 
Simon’s argument is that if we insist, within our
mainstream security governance institutions, on
governing harms primarily through crime – that
is, if we insist on labelling harms as crimes and
then look for people to blame and punish for
these harms – we must expect prevention to fall
by the wayside. In other words, if the institutions
of criminal justice insist on making blame and
punishment their top priority, as they now do,
prevention will not fare well within their
boundaries. That is not to say that the blaming
done by criminal justice doesn’t have an
important place within security governance. What
it does mean is that blaming should not be the
only mainstream response.17 When we, as a
society, insist on only labelling harms as crimes,
we favour a blaming/punishing response at the
expense of prevention.  For instance, making up
harms as losses (as insurance companies, for
example, often do) entails a different way of
responding to that loss. Rather than automatically
favouring a blaming response, the response would
be more orientated towards trying to prevent
future losses and shaping governance practices to
achieve this.    
How might one loosen the tight coupling of crime
and prevention?  The short answer: Through
reforming our institutions of security governance.
From blame to prevention:
Institutions 
Institutions of criminal justice consist of a set of
organisational arrangements that bring people
together to construct harms in terms of ‘offenders’
and ‘victims’ and then go through a process of
allocating both blame and punishment to
offenders. These functions, and the institutions
that realise them, lie at the very core of the
criminal justice assemblage. One can moderate
what the criminal justice system does by adding
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on various other objectives and processes (as is
done for example by building restorative
processes into it), but this does not alter what the
assemblage does. If the principal set of
institutions dealing with harms is the criminal
justice system, then we should expect blaming
and punishment, not prevention.   
This will not be altered by a shift of intention, or
by policy reports such as the NCPS. One can talk
about prevention in policy after policy but if our
principal state institutions for governing security
have as their central functions blame and
punishment, prevention will not become an
important feature of our government of security.
It is not our thoughts, intentions or words that
determine where our commitments really lie, but
our institutions.  
If one hands the problem of crime exclusively
over to a set of institutions that are not designed
to be preventative, one cannot expect those
institutions to deliver preventative solutions.18 If
we hand over our security problems exclusively to
the criminal justice system we should expect
them to be dealt with by means of blame and
punishment. Or, as Braithwaite puts it, if blame
and punishment constitute our ‘ritual of comfort’
we will continue to do this, no matter what
evidence there is to the contrary.19
If we are serious about prevention we are going to
have to ensure that we rely on institutions that are
designed to prevent, to govern security. If, as a
society, we are serious about prevention we will
need to reform our existing institutions so that
they hold prevention to be important, as well as
build new ones that are designed to promote
prevention.20 For instance, in order to give effect
to a whole-of-society governance system, the
Western Cape Provincial Government is involved
in conceptualising a new institution, the Western
Cape Safety Partnership – a non-state
organisation – with the purpose of strengthening
already existing whole-of-society initiatives, and
creating new ones across the Western Cape.21 An
important feature of this envisaged partnership
will be its ability to mobilise resources from both
state and non-state sectors and align these with
context-specific solutions. The Partnership would
have fulcrum capacity. (A fulcrum, as we have
used the term here, is a site of coordination that
establishes effective governance capacity for
public goods by connecting the relevant
institutions able to contribute to the resolution of
the problem – whichever institutions these may
be.)     
So how is this to be done? Short answer: By
changing the flows of money.
From blame to prevention: Money 
If we are to understand why prevention is almost
always a second cousin within the governance of
security we are going to have to understand where
the spend on security goes. Similarly, if we want
to change things so that prevention becomes a
first cousin, we are going to have to find ways of
changing the paths along which money flows. If
we are to realise the dream of a set of procedures
for governing security that gives priority to
prevention, we are going to have to get much
better than we have been at following the money,
and then, and more importantly, changing the
flow of that money.
Although there are oversight procedures that see
to it that our money is not wasted or stolen, this is
not what we have in mind. What we do have in
mind is determining whether budgets are being
used to fulfil whole-of-society objectives. If we are
going to be able to engage in reshaping the way
we govern security we are going to have to find
ways of redirecting our security governance
budgets.
One of the reasons so little prevention is taking
place (this is obvious but needs to be explicitly
stated) is that there is so little money for it. At
present most, indeed almost all, of our tax monies
allocated to security governance are spent on
blaming and punishing. The reason for this (and
again it is obvious but needs to be stated) is that
there is so little zero-based budgeting within our
security governance arrangements. What we need
are systems that require outcomes that answer the
question highlighted at the outset: ‘How can we
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reduce the likelihood of this happening again?’,
rather than ‘Who is to blame?’  
When funding security, governments seldom start
out with a clean slate, with what might be thought
of as a security budget, that they then allocate to
institutions and programmes they believe will be
effective in dealing with the prevention of harms.
Instead, our governments currently give almost all
our security governance money to the institutions
that specialise in blame and punishment. It
follows that any prevention either takes place as a
spinoff of blaming activities – for example, as
deterrence brought about through punishment –
or through temporarily, and usually poorly
funded, ‘add-ons’, as is typically the case with
more whole-of-society approaches. 
None of this will be easy. It is particularly difficult
when our dominant ‘rituals of comfort’ encourage
the way of thinking we are currently stuck in.
Furthermore, none of the shifts we have
advocated can be made without taking specific
contexts into account and without seeking out,
and responding to, opportunities for change when
they arrive. Policy alone, as we know from the
NCPS, is not going to provide solutions. But,
having said this, we do need a set of guiding
principles that will enable us to look for, and
create, opportunities for change that are context
specific. We need design principles. 
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
The story we have painted above is the story of a
rut – a thinking rut. We are in a thinking rut in
terms of the way we think about ‘crime,’ the
institutions we have designed to govern ‘crime’,
and the way we have spent our tax monies.22
The message here is that we should start with our
thinking. Only if we first change our thinking will
we be able to change our practice. Practice follows
thinking. For best practice we first need best
thinking.  
This distinction between thinking and practice is
important and is intended to shift the focus from
practice to thinking. An emphasis on best
practice, and the idea that practices from one
context can simply and easily be shifted to
another, downplays the importance of context. In
doing so it fails to recognise that context almost
always matters. What works in one context is
unlikely to simply work in another. To get from
one context to another it is necessary to work at
the level of thinking, of principle, rather than at
the level of practice. Well-founded thinking
(principles) travel well. Context-specific practices
do not. 
Identifying best practices usually entails drawing
on the ways of doing things that have worked in
one context and applying them to another 
context. However, experience has shown that this
is typically not possible – practices that have
worked in one context will often not work in
another. To implement prevention in a
meaningful, context-specific way one needs to
identify the ways of thinking, or principles,
underlying the practices. To put it in another way,
we can derive rules from principles, and ‘whereas
rules may be specific, principles may be very
abstract’, and thus applicable to a number of
contexts.23
Design principle 1
Limit governing through crime to a minimum, 
and insist on governing harm  
We need to be more careful about how, and when,
we use the label ‘crime’. Achieving this will require
a different way of thinking about our world and
the harms we face in it. Applying this principle
will force us to adopt a broader way of thinking
about security governance. It will require us to
think more carefully about the harms we may face,
and whether these harms should be thought of as
crimes, or as risk to be managed in other, more
preventative, ways.  
There are many contexts that demonstrate how
this principle can be effectively applied in practice,
for example any well-run company that is focused
on reducing its losses rather than on simply
blaming and punishing. The airline industry has
also applied this principle to very good effect.24
CQ No. 36 - June 2011  7/5/11  10:24 AM  Page 31
28 Institute for Security Studies
DESIGN PRINCIPLE 2
Reshape the institutional environment within
which harms are governed  
One context where this principle has been taken
seriously, and applied, is Northern Ireland. For
instance, one of the recommendations made by
the Patten Commission (an independent
Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland)
was to create a Policing Board (as opposed to a
Police Board).25 The establishment of a Policing
Board worked, at the level of practice, to broaden
the understanding of security governance in ways
that enabled non-blaming activities to be
recognised and supported. The establishment of a
Policing Board in Northern Ireland enabled the
government to focus on, and support, institutions
and activities that were explicitly preventative in
their design.26 Although developing a similar
approach here may be a possibility (such as the
Western Cape Safety Partnership mentioned
above), the idea or underlying principle, as
mentioned, is to develop fulcrum capacity, so that
a range of resources may be aligned to
appropriate solutions.     
Design principle 3
Change the flows of money so that it is channelled
to institutions and activities that support
prevention  
One way this can be done is for governments to
shift their focus from institutional budgets that
assume money only goes to the established
blaming institutions, to functional budgets that
are explicitly designed to support preventative
activities. Depending on the context, this can
mean funding anything from a local community
patrol to an early childhood development centre.27
Again Northern Ireland provides an example.
Functional budgets were developed to support
community safety partnerships that were
explicitly designed to find and maintain
preventative initiatives involving a range of
partners including ‘statutory agencies, such as
police, probation, social services, education and
health; voluntary agencies and groups; local
government; community groups; and the private
sector.’28 Functional budgets allow governments to
move beyond existing institutions and to seek out
arrangements within and outside state
institutions that enable a wide variety of
preventative outcomes.29 Once again, this is not to
say that the criminal justice system should not be
recognised as an important set of institutions
within the security governance mix, but it does
encourage these institutions to look for ways in
which they can attract monies earmarked for
prevention, and enables others to put in bids for
these funds. 
CONCLUSION
These three design principles direct us to what
we at the outset termed a whole-of-society
approach to security governance. This emphasis
is consistent with a significant body of evidence,
much of which was surveyed and considered in
the NCPS, that confirms that prevention requires
the identification, mobilisation and integration of
a variety of resources found across the public, the
private and the civil society sectors. Prevention
can only succeed if security is broadly conceived
and acted upon through a range of state and non-
state entities at all levels, all bringing to the table
their own sets of knowledge, skills and resources.
A prominent normative focus then becomes how
one best promotes this while also adhering to the
practices of good governance. What is required is
an approach that allows the following question
from Colleen Lewis and Jennifer Wood to be
posed, considered and answered.
…what mix of governance mechanisms might
best contribute to the protection of
fundamental democratic principles like equity,
fairness, access to justice, and human rights
whilst at the same time allowing innovative
arrangements to ‘bubble up’ in ways that
acknowledge local needs and preferences?30
Finding practical answers to this question, in
South Africa, will take time and effort. This will
only be possible if the normative search that
Lewis and Wood advocate is guided by principles
that have been honed in a crucible of practice.
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We believe that the three principles we have
outlined provide the required basis for pursuing
this quest.
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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